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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Watt appeals from the district court's appellate decision affirming the
magistrate's order denying Watt's motion to suppress.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Watt was issued a citation for possession of marijuana and possession of
paraphernalia. (R., p.5.) Watt filed a motion to suppress, contending "the officer
unreasonably extended the detention ... after the purpose of the stop had been
abandoned." (R., p.17.) At the suppression hearing, Watt clarified that "it was
the conversion of the consensual encounter into an unreasonable detention that
was the subject of' his request for suppression. (R., p.37 n.3.) The magistrate
denied the motion, Watt entered a conditional guilty plea to both possession
charges, reserving the right to appeal the suppression issue, and the district
court affirmed the denial on intermediate appeal. (R., pp.36-40, 43, 82-93, 4546.) Watt timely appealed from the district court's Memorandum Decision and
Order. (R., pp.95-97.)

1

ISSUE
Watt states the issue on appeal as:
I.
Did the trial court err when it failed to grant the defendant's
Motion to Suppress based on the lack of reasonable articulable
suspicion to prolong the detention in violation of Mr. Watt's 4th, 5th,
and 6th Amendment Rights of the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 13 and 17 of the Idaho Constitution?[1]

(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Watt failed to show error in the district court's intermediate appellate
decision affirming the magistrate's denial of his motion to suppress?

1

Although Watt cites multiple constitutional amendments in his statement of the
issue, he only argues a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Because Watt has failed to
present any argument in support of any other basis for finding a constitutional
violation (see generally Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11), any such claim is waived.
Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, _ , 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996) (noting an issue will not
be considered if "either authority or argument is lacking" and declining to
consider appellant's claim because he failed to "provide[] a single authority or
legal proposition to support his argument").
2

ARGUMENT
Watt Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress
Introduction

A.

Watt challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, contending as he did
below that law enforcement unlawfully prolonged his detention to facilitate a drug
dog sniff of his car. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) Watt's argument fails. A review
of the applicable law, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, and the
magistrate court's factual findings and conclusions of law supports the district
court's determination that the magistrate did not err in denying Watt's motion to
suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

kl

"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure."

kl

(citing Losser, 145

Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137
(1981 )).
3

"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts." State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power to assess the
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence.

State v.

Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

C.

Watt Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Intermediate
Appellate Decision Affirming The Magistrate's Denial Of Watt's
Suppression Motion
Following the suppression hearing, the magistrate filed a written decision

that includes the following factual findings:
On February 12, 2013, at approximately 10:15 p.m., Ada
County Sheriff's Deputy Barry Clark was on routine patrol in Eagle,
Idaho near the intersection of Eagle Rd[.] and Easy Jet. Deputy
Clark pulled into the parking lot of a closed business at that location
in order to complete some paperwork. Upon proceeding into the
back parking lot of the business, the Deputy noted a silver Buick
passenger car near the business' dumpster.
Deputy Clark
observed that the business was closed and that there were no
other cars in the lot. Because the Deputy rarely saw anyone at the
business after 8:00 p.m., he proceeded to approach the dumpster
where he saw a male on the side of the dumpster's fence-like
enclosure, who then walked into the dumpster enclosure and then
exited the enclosure walking towards the silver Buick. Deputy Clark
parked his vehicle and approached the male and asked him what
he was doing there. The male, later identified as Jaryn Watt,
4

responded that he was headed to a friend's house and had stopped
there to throw away some trash. Immediately upon contact, Deputy
Clark noted that Watt's eyes did not react to the light of his
flashlight and that they appeared bloodshot and watery, although
Watt did not smell of an alcoholic beverage. Deputy Clark inquired
of Watt whether he was taking prescription medication to which
Watt replied he was not. Deputy Clark then went to his patrol
vehicle with Watt's Idaho Driver's License to check wants and
warrants and to determine if a narcotics detention canine unit was
in the area.
Pending the canine unit's arrival, Deputy Clark
proceeded to conduct Field Sobriety Tests which revealed Watt's
inability to estimate passage of time, eyelid tremors, and elevated
pulse; all indicative of intoxicant use. Deputy Tena and his canine
unit arrived just prior to Deputy Clark's completion of field sobriety
tests with Watt. Watt then admitted to possession of a small
amount of marijuana along with a pipe in a bag in the front of his
car.
(R., pp.36-37 (footnotes omitted).)

The magistrate also found that "Deputy Clark did not deploy his overhead
lights or effect a traffic stop, rather his intent was a consensual contact with" Watt
(R., p.36 n.1 ), and that "it took approximately seven minutes from Deputy Clark's

first contact with [Watt] for Deputy Tena and his canine unit to arrive at the
contact location" (R., p.37 n.2).
Watt does not dispute any of the magistrate's factual findings.

(See

generally Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) And, the district court found the findings are
"supported by the record."

(R., pp.87-88.)

Watt instead argues "[t]here was

nothing to suggest to the officer that criminal activity was afoot and instead of
concluding the encounter, the officer had [Watt] wait an additional five minutes
for the drug detection dog and then asked questions with respect to illegal
drugs."

(Appellant's Brief, p.11.)

Watt further argues his "detention was

unreasonably lengthened when Officer Clark began testing [him] with regards to

5

a potential DUI investigation," claiming It "is specifically telling" that Officer Clark
"performed in his own tests in an apparent stall and delay tactic to ensure the
arrival of the K9" rather than performing "standard field sobriety testing" such as
the "horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk and turn, [and] one leg stand." (Appellant's
Brief, p.11.) Watts' argument is unsupported by the facts and the law.
"The Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and
seizures applies to the seizures of persons through arrests or detentions falling
short of arrest." State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (Ct.
App. 2002) (citations omitted). "Under Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)], an
investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts
which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be
engaged in criminal activity." State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d
1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).

"The justification for an investigate detention is

evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances then known to the officer."

kl

(citations omitted). "[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no
longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Roe, 140
Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926,931 (Ct. App. 2004). "There is no rigid time-limit for
determining when a detention has lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court
must consider the scope of the detention and the law enforcement purposes to
be served, as well as the duration of the stop." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho
490,496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470
U.S. 675, 685-86 (1985)).

6

Watt does not dispute that his initial contact with Officer Clark was a
consensual encounter. (See Supp. Tr., p.46, L.24 - p.47, L.1; Appellant's Brief,
p.10 ("Officer Clark immediately directed his efforts toward a drug/DUI
investigation completely unrelated to the initial consensual encounter.").) Thus,
the only questions are whether there was reasonable articulable suspicion to
detain Watt after the initial consensual contact and whether the length of that
detention was reasonable. The answer to both questions is yes.
Once Deputy Clark made contact with Watt, he quickly had reasonable
articulable suspicion that Watt was under the influence of drugs and had, by his
own admission, driven to the parking lot in which Deputy Clark first made contact
with him and stated he intended to continue driving to his "friend's house."
(Supp. Tr., p.7, Ls.16-22.) Deputy Clark's reasonable articulable suspicion was
based on his observations, which he made "right away," that Watt's "pupils didn't
react much to light" and Watt's "eyes were bloodshot and watery." (Supp. Tr.,
p.8, Ls.16-19.)

Because Deputy Clark did not smell alcohol and Watt denied

taking prescription medications, Deputy Clark suspected Watt may be under the
influence of a controlled substance. (Supp. Tr., p.8, L.20 - p.9, L.4.) After noting
Watt's appearance, Deputy Clark returned to his patrol car to check Watt's
license status and to see if he had any "wants and warrants." (Supp. Tr., p.9,
Ls.11-14.) At the same time, Deputy Clark "typed Deputy Juan Tenna to see if
he was close by" because Deputy Tenna is a "narcotics K9 handler." (Supp. Tr.,
p.9, Ls.14-15, p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.5.)

Because Deputy Tenna was close by,

Deputy Clark asked him to "respond to [his] location." (Supp. Tr., p.11, Ls.5-8.)
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While waiting for Deputy Tenna, Deputy Clark checked Watt's eyes
"to see how dilated they were" and noted they "were dilated to eight millimeters,"
with the "normal range" being "from three to 6 millimeters."
Ls.16-19.)

(Supp. Tr., p.11,

Deputy Clark then "perform[ed] what's called the 'Romberg stand

test," the purpose of which tests "someone's internal body clock"; if an individual
is under the influence of a stimulant, his "clock is usually fast," and if under the
influence of a depressant, his clock is "usually slow." (Supp. Tr., p.12, L.15 p.13, L.4.) With a "drug like marijuana," it can be "distorted" so an examiner will
"also look for eye lid [sic] tremors," "body sway," "twitching of the fingers," or
"grinding ... teeth." (Supp. Tr., p.13, Ls.5-9.) On the Romberg stand test, Watt
"estimated 30 seconds in 20 seconds" and "had pretty distinct eyelid tremors."
(Supp. Tr., p.13, Ls.10-13.) Deputy Clark also took Watt's pulse, which was "100
beats per minute." (Supp. Tr., p.13, Ls.16-24.)

Deputy Tenna arrived before

Deputy Clark was finished with his tests and just seven minutes after Deputy
Clark first made consensual contact with Watt.

(Supp. Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14,

L.10) Watt admitted there was marijuana in his car after the deputies explained
that Deputy Tenna "would be running his dog on the exterior of [the] car." (Supp.
Tr., p.14, L.25- p.15, L.13.)
Deputy Clark legally detained Watt for a reasonable period of time to
confirm or dispel his suspicion that Watt was under the influence of drugs.
Deputy Clark did not "prolong" Watt's detention by seeking the assistance of a
drug detection dog; the drug detection dog was requested as part of Deputy
Clark's

investigatory detention

and

Deputy Clark diligently pursued
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his

investigation without delay.

Moreover, Watt's belief that Deputy Clark should

have performed different tests generally related to driving under the influence of
alcohol instead of the specific tests chosen by Deputy Clark given his belief that
Watt was under the influence of something other than alcohol, falls far short of
showing an improper "stall and delay tactic" much less a constitutional violation.
The district court and magistrate both correctly concluded the investigatory
detention of Watt was constitutionally reasonable. Compare State v. Brumfield,
136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001) (detention that began as
traffic stop properly evolved into drug investigation based on information
available to officer and it was not unreasonable to detain the vehicle's occupants
for 49 minutes to await arrival of drug dog where officers "pursued their
investigation diligently and with reasonable speed").

Watt has failed to show

error in the district court's order affirming the magistrate's denial of his motion to
suppress. 2

2

Watt cites both the Fourth Amendment and Art. I,§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution
in his brief and notes the latter "provides more privacy protection as well as more
remedial protection including suppression," specifically claiming that "[a]lthough
the Federal Exclusionary rule has been whittled away at through case law,
Idaho's Constitution and the Exclusionary Rule are still in full force and effect."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5, 7-8 (capitalization original).)
Watt further argues
"Idahoans are more protective of their privacy" and "are more concerned about
the innocent being affected by overzealous police" and "thus the Courts should
provide us with more protection." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Watt does not,
however, explain why the legal standards relied upon by either the magistrate or
the district court, and which are included in this brief, are inapplicable under Art.
I, § 17; indeed, these same standards have been applied by Idaho's appellate
courts in numerous cases as is evident by the citations to Idaho authority
included in the record and this brief. Absent a cogent reason to now depart from
those standards when considering a claim under Art. I, § 17, which Watt has not
given, the Court should continue to adhere to them. See State v. Koivu, 152
Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) ("We will ordinarily not overrule one of
9

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
decision affirming the magistrate's denial of Watt's motion to suppress.
DATED this 14th day of July, 2014.

JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General

L/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of July, 2014, served two
true and correct copies of the attached APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF by placing
the copies in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
HEIDI M. TOLMAN
Ada County Public Defender's Office
200 W. Front Street, Ste. 1107
Boise, ID 83702

S CAM. LORELLO
ty Attorney General
JML/pm

our prior opinions unless it is shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the
holding in the case has proven over time to be unwise or unjust.").
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